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A PROPOSAL TO THE SEVENTH AND NINTH
CIRCUIT SPLIT: EXPAND THE REACH OF THE U.S.
ANTITRUST LAWS TO EXTRATERRITORIAL
CONDUCT THAT IMPACTS U.S. COMMERCE
I. INTRODUCTION
Antitrust laws concern conduct that either occurs in the United
States or that is concocted elsewhere, but executed in the United
States.1  For over 100 years, courts have variedly interpreted these an-
titrust laws by balancing concerns of international comity and deter-
rence of wrongful conduct.2  This approach has led to some
development of U.S. antitrust case law, but courts have yet to find
common ground in determining how to properly apply these laws to
conduct that is extraterritorial in its execution, yet still has effects that
indirectly harm U.S. commerce.3  The laws, as interpreted, are still un-
clear.4  Some courts prefer to apply a “broad” rule, wherein foreign
companies that engage in extraterritorial anticompetitive conduct may
be liable under U.S. antitrust laws, so as long as there is a link be-
tween the conduct and U.S. commerce;5 others require a “narrow”
rule, wherein the alleged anticompetitive conduct is required to cause
stronger and more obvious effects to U.S. commerce.6  The courts’ dif-
ficulty in assessing which rule to apply can be attributed to the vague
language of the Sherman Act.7  The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improve-
ments Act (FTAIA)8 purportedly clarified that language.  Existing
case law suggests that not much clarity has evolved out of that at-
1. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993).
2. See Jaafar A. Riazi, Note, Finding Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Antitrust Claims of Ex-
traterritorial Origin: Whether the Seventh Circuit’s Approach Properly Balances Policies of Inter-
national Comity and Deterrence, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1277, 1277–79 (2005).
3. Id. at 1279.
4. See infra notes 22–194 and accompanying text. R
5. See Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816, 818 (7th Cir. 2015) (hold-
ing that the defendants’ sale of price-fixed LCD panels to foreign purchasers did not give rise to
an anti-trust claim under the Sherman Act).
6. See United States v. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d 738, 751 (9th Cir. 2015) (reiterating the “immedi-
ate consequence” test of the Seventh Circuit and narrowly interpreting the FTAIA).
7. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012).
8. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012).
175
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tempt; the courts continue to have diverging interpretations of the
statutes.9
One example of the diverging interpretations is the circuit split be-
tween the Seventh and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal, concerning
the interpretation of the Sherman Act and the FTAIA in relation to
non-import trade.10  The Seventh Circuit, in Motorola Mobility LLC
v. AU Optronics Corp., adopted the “narrow” rule by holding that a
foreign company may only be liable under U.S. laws if that company
was engaged in transactions that directly affected U.S. commerce.11
On the contrary, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Hui Hsiung ap-
plied the “broad” rule by holding that foreign transactions may be
subject to U.S. jurisdiction if the transactions had an effect—even
though indirectly—on U.S commerce.12  This Comment argues that
the other circuits, and eventually, the U.S. Supreme Court, should
adopt the Ninth Circuit’s “broad” rule in Hui Hsiung, especially in
light of the globalized economy and the increasing demand for inter-
national business transactions.13
Part II provides background information on (a) the Sherman Act,14
(b) the FTAIA,15 (c) relevant case law interpreting both the Sherman
Act and the FTAIA,16 and (d) the most recent circuit split between
United States v. Hui Hsiung and Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Op-
tronics Corp. regarding the reach of the Sherman Act to non-import
trade.17  Part III provides an analysis of (a) the need for an established
rule;18 (b) the differing arguments of the Ninth and Seventh Circuits
in the extent of the FTAIA’s reach;19 and (c) a proposal to adopt the
Ninth Circuit ruling as the more appropriate interpretation of the stat-
ute, as this interpretation aligns more closely with legislative intent of
the FTAIA, supports the proposition that antitrust laws are meant to
protect consumers, is more likely to deter perpetrators of antitrust
laws, and is more appropriate in today’s global economy.20  Part IV
9. See infra notes 53–191 and accompanying text. R
10. Compare Motorola, 775 F.3d at 818–19, with Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d at 746.
11. Motorola, 775 F.3d at 819.
12. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d at 759.
13. This Comment assumes that the questions regarding the FTAIA are not jurisdictional is-
sues, but rather require analysis of the elements of a claim.  Therefore, analysis as to whether
courts have subject matter jurisdiction over a particular claim will not be discussed.
14. See infra notes 29–48 and accompanying text. R
15. See infra notes 49–83 and accompanying text. R
16. See infra notes 84–141 and accompanying text. R
17. See infra notes 142–94 and accompanying text. R
18. See infra notes 195–237 and accompanying text. R
19. See infra notes 238–90 and accompanying text. R
20. See infra notes 291–373 and accompanying text. R
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demonstrates the impact of the proposed solution on consumers, in-
ternational business transactions, and the global economy.21  Finally,
Part V concludes that the Ninth Circuit ruling must prevail, and other
circuits and the U.S. Supreme Court should adopt the Ninth Circuit’s
“broad” ruling.
II. BACKGROUND: DEVELOPMENT OF THE APPLICATION OF U.S.
ANTITRUST LAW TO EXTRATERRITORIAL CONDUCT
BEFORE AND AFTER THE FTAIA
The Sherman Act was first interpreted to mean that anticompetitive
conduct that does not occur in the United States has no place in U.S.
jurisdiction.22  That reasoning was later relaxed, and the courts started
interpreting the statute based on the effects of the anticompetitive
conduct.23  Despite this shift, courts struggled with how to correctly
interpret the statute, so the FTAIA was enacted to purportedly “clar-
ify” when U.S. antitrust law applies to foreign conduct.24  The lan-
guage of the FTAIA is both broad and narrow enough that courts
have interpreted its meaning differently.  To date, circuit splits regard-
ing how to interpret the requirements that conduct has a (1) “direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect,” which (2) “gives rise
to a claim,” continue to confuse courts and businesses alike.25  This
Part discusses the development of U.S. antitrust laws;26 the various
interpretations of the Sherman Act and the FTAIA;27 and the most
recent circuit split between the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in United States
v. Hui Hsiung and the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Motorola Mobility
LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., which deals with the application of the
FTAIA as it applies to non-import trade.28
21. See infra notes 374–432 and accompanying text. R
22. See, e.g., Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355–56 (1909), overruled by
W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Env’t Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400 (1990) (holding that the act
of state doctrine is not implicated even when international comity, respect for foreign nations,
and avoidance of embarrassment to the Executive Branch are at issue).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (determining
that Alcoa was not an illegal monopoly under the Sherman Act), superseded by statute, Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1246, as recognized in
United States v. LSL Biotechs., 379 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2004).
24. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1246
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012)); Riazi, supra note 2, at 1314. R
25. 15 U.S.C. § 6a; see infra notes 198–237 and accompanying text. R
26. See infra notes 29–48 and accompanying text. R
27. See infra notes 49–141 and accompanying text. R
28. See infra notes 142–47 and accompanying text. R
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A. Sherman Act: Foundation of U.S. Antitrust Law
The United States Constitution empowers Congress “[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States.”29
Congress enacted the Sherman Act pursuant to that authority.30  Sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations.”31  Sec-
tion 2 criminalizes monopolization and any “attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopo-
lize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations.”32  The general and vague language of the Sher-
man Act has led to the courts’ various, and sometimes conflicting,
interpretations.
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.33 was the first case consid-
ered by the U.S. Supreme Court with regard to the extraterritorial
reach of the Sherman Act.34  American Banana alleged that United
Fruit Co. induced the Puerto Rican government to monopolize the
tropical fruit market by threatening, invading, and seizing its planta-
tion and railway.35  In affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the com-
plaint, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the legality (or illegality) of
acts must be determined by the law of the country in which the alleged
illegal acts were committed.36  Therefore, the Sherman Act did not
apply because the alleged conduct occurred in a foreign country.37
The Court reasoned that holding otherwise would interfere with an-
other sovereign’s authority and would undermine the soundness of the
established comity of nations.38
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
30. Commerce Clause, CORNELL U. L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/commerce
_clause (last updated June 2016).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).  The language of the Sherman Act makes it appear as though every
single contract or combination thereof that restrains trade is illegal; however, it has been estab-
lished that only unreasonable restraints on trade are prohibited. See United States v. Aluminum
Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), superseded by statute, Foreign Trade Antitrust Improve-
ments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1246, as recognized in United States v. LSL
Biotechs., 379 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2004).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
33. 213 U.S. 347 (1909), overruled by W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Env’t Tectonics Corp., Int’l,
493 U.S. 400 (1990) (overruling the act of state component).
34. Jeffrey H. Smith, Note, Call Me Maybe? The Seventh Circuit’s Call in Motorola Mobility,
90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2063, 2065 (2015).
35. Am. Banana, 213 U.S. at 354–55.
36. Id. at 348, 356.
37. Id. at 357.
38. Id. at 356.
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Thirty years later, Judge Learned Hand, writing for the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, relaxed the strictly territorial rule.  In United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, Judge Hand applied an “effects
test” to determine whether suit can be brought in the United States
against a foreign entity.39  The United States brought suit against the
aluminum producer and manufacturer, Alcoa, for participating in a
foreign cartel that eliminated all competition by limiting the produc-
tion and fixing the prices of “virgin” aluminum ingot.40  The circuit
court found that the Sherman Act should be read considering “the
limitations customarily observed by nations upon the exercise of their
powers.”41  Therefore, any interpretation of the statute “should not
impute to Congress an intent to punish all whom its courts can catch,
for conduct which has no consequences within the United States.”42
After considering the international complications of applying U.S. an-
titrust laws to foreign companies and the difficulty in forcing courts to
apply different canons of interpretation, the majority ultimately held
that the statute must only govern agreements that are “intended to
affect imports and did affect them.”43  Applying this standard to the
case, Judge Hand found that Alcoa violated section 1 of the Sherman
Act.44
Other jurisdictions followed suit and developed various formula-
tions of the “effects test” first used in Alcoa.  Judge Hand did not
provide any specificity as to how “some effect” should be interpreted
in subsequent cases.45  In effect, the burden shifted from the plaintiff
to the defendant to prove that the alleged conduct did not have any
effect in the United States.46  In practice, more emphasis was placed
on a foreign company’s intent to affect the United States, rather than
determining how the standard should be used in subsequent deci-
39. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945), superseded by
statute, Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1246, as
recognized in United States v. LSL Biotechs., 379 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2004).
40. Id. at 442.  Producers in a similar market that cooperate to protect their own interests
usually form what is known as a “cartel.” Cartels, ECON. ONLINE, http://www.economicson-
line.co.uk/Business_economics/Cartels.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2016).  Usually, the interest re-
volves around making more money. Cartel, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster
.com/dictionary/cartel (last visited Aug. 11, 2016).  Cartels can restrict trade transactions by in-
creasing the price of products and reduce production output released to the market. Cartels,
ECON. ONLINE, supra.
41. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d at 443.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 444.
44. Id. at 427.
45. Id. at 444.
46. Gerard F. Bifulco, Comment, From Sea to Shining Sea: A New Approach to Interpreting
the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 64 EMORY L.J. 869, 879 (2015).
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sions.47  In light of the broad language of the Sherman Act and the
various possible interpretations of the “effects test,” courts have ap-
plied this “overreaching” rule.48
B. Federal Trade and Antitrust Improvement Act: “Clarification” of
the Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws
Congress responded to the controversial reach of the Sherman Act
by clarifying its extent under the FTAIA’s objective test.49  The Act
states, “Sections 1 to 7 of [the Sherman Act] shall not apply to con-
duct involving trade or commerce (other than import trade or import
commerce) with foreign nations unless (1) such conduct has a direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect [on U.S. commerce]”50
and “(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the [Sherman Act].”51
The FTAIA, according to the U.S. Supreme Court in F. Hoffman-
La Roche v. Empagran,52 excludes all conduct regarding import trade
or commerce with foreign nations from compliance with the Sherman
Act, but it brings some conduct back into the Act’s reach, so long as
(1) the conduct has a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
effect” on certain American commerce, and (2) such conduct gives
rise to a Sherman Act claim.53  This “clarification,” however, has
caused a variety of legal contentions, as courts interpret the statutory
terms “direct,” “substantial,” “reasonably foreseeable,” and “gives
rise to a claim” differently.54
Courts construe the language of a statute pursuant to the surround-
ing context and give words their plain and ordinary meaning.55  When
a statute’s meaning is ambiguous from a plain reading of its language,
courts look beyond the statutory language and consider the purpose
of the law and the legislative history of the statute.56  Congress in-
tended to “formulate a standard to be applied uniformly throughout
the federal judicial system” when it enacted the FTAIA.57  Specifi-
cally, it wanted to “clearly establish when antitrust liability attaches to
47. Id.
48. See Riazi, supra note 2, at 1309. R
49. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-920, 96 Stat. 1246
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §6a (2012)).
50. Id. § 6a(1).
51. Id. § 6a(2).
52. F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
53. Id. at 163 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 9–10 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2487, 2495).
54. See infra notes 62–194 and accompanying text. R
55. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997).
56. Id. at 341.
57. H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 6 (1982).
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international business activities.”58  Relevant themes from the House
bill pointed out that Congress clearly intended that (1) transactions
between two foreign firms have no place in U.S. jurisdiction, absent a
direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect;59 (2) foreign
purchasers injured by a price-fixing conspiracy that does not have an
effect to U.S. commerce do not have recourse in the United States;60
and (3) the “effect” of the conduct must be the basis of the alleged
conduct.61  Despite these overarching themes, courts remain divided
as to how the FTAIA must be interpreted.
When the Ninth Circuit decided Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
America N.T. & S.A., it balanced a three-part test to determine
whether U.S. antitrust laws can reach an extraterritorial conduct.62
Timberlane, an American lumber company, and its Honduran part-
ners and businesses, brought suit against Bank of America’s Hondu-
ran timber companies for conspiring to drive them out of business.63
The court explained that some effect on American foreign commerce
must have occurred before any application of the FTAIA can be un-
dertaken.64  Next, the effect must have been “sufficiently large to pre-
sent a cognizable injury to the plaintiff.”65  Finally, U.S. interests must
have been sufficiently justified to assert extraterritorial authority.66
The court analyzed the conduct and concluded that the timber compa-
nies “intended to, and did, affect the export of lumber from Honduras
to the United States,” thereby satisfying the first two parts of the bal-
ancing test.67  The court ultimately held that the district court’s dismis-
sal was inappropriate, even after considering international comity and
fairness questions.68  It reasoned that there was no conflict with the
law or policy of the Honduran government, such that the United
States would have to intervene.69
58. Id. at 7.
59. Id. at 8–9.
60. Id. at 12.
61. Id.
62. 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976), superseded by statute, FTAIA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012),
as recognized in McClinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 813 (9th Cir. 1987).
63. Id. at 604.
64. Id. at 613.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 615.
68. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 615.  International comity is a principle of international law that
recognizes other countries’ legislative, executive, or judicial acts. Comity, DUHAIME’S L. DIC-
TIONARY, http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/C/Comity.aspx (last visited Aug. 11, 2016).
69. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 615.
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The Second Circuit, in National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card
Ass’n,70 warned that independent analysis of the first two parts of the
balancing test in Timberlane may lead to an “assertion of jurisdiction
whenever the challenged conduct is shown to have some effect.”71
National Bank brought suit against Interbank, arguing that In-
terbank’s stipulation to approve a licensing agreement “only if Na-
tional Bank disposed of the ‘Visa’ card business” violated the
Sherman Act because it limited competition and affected United
States commerce.72  Applying Timberlane, the Second Circuit held
that the objectionable conduct must “be forsee[able] to have any ap-
preciable anticompetitive effect on United States commerce” before
the Sherman Act can impose any liability.73  Consequently, it held that
although the profitability of merchants in the market was impacted,
the exclusion of National Bank in the Interbank system, as a result of
Interbank’s advertent decisions and actions, did not pose a foresee-
able threat to United States commerce.74  The court concluded that
National Bank failed to create a relationship between the objected
conduct and any anticompetitive consequences to United States
commerce.75
In Hartford Fire Insurance v. California,76 the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled on whether various London-based reinsurance companies con-
spired to coerce U.S. reinsurers to change certain policy practices that
drove costs up, in violation of the Sherman Act.77  A divided Court
overruled the territorial approach of American Banana Co. and held
that foreign companies may be held liable under U.S. antitrust laws if
the conduct “was meant to produce and did in fact produce some sub-
stantial effects in the United States.”78  The Court also held that the
Sherman Act applied, and not the FTAIA, because the conduct in
question was “import commerce.”79  Therefore, an analysis under the
“direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” test did not
have to be employed.80  Justice Scalia, in his dissent, expressed his
70. Nat’l Bank of Can. v. Interbank Card Ass’n, 666 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981).
71. Id. at 8.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 9.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
77. Id. at 770–71.
78. Id. at 795–96.
79. Id. at 796 n.23.
80. Id.; see also Richard W. Beckler & Matthew H. Kirtland, Extraterritorial Application of
U.S. Antitrust Law: What Is a “Direct, Substantial, and Reasonably Foreseeable Effect” Under the
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act?, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 11, 15 (2003).
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concern with the majority’s expansive extraterritorial application of
the Sherman Act; he believed that the majority’s opinion would of-
fend customary international law because it ignored “proscriptive
comity.”81  According to him, the majority created a “sharp and un-
necessary conflict with the legitimate interests of other countries.”82
Despite legislators’ intent to “clarify” the reach of the Sherman Act
through the enactment of the FTAIA, circuit courts still consider both
statutes vague.83  As the next section highlights, this has led to contin-
ued substantial disagreements over the statutes’ proper
interpretations.
C. Various Interpretations of the FTAIA Continue
to Plague the Courts
Earlier case law considered the second part of the FTAIA require-
ment that ensured that the Sherman Act only applied when the “di-
rect effects” of the alleged conduct “gave rise to a claim.”  In Den
Norske Stats Oljeselskap v. Heeremac Vof,84 a Norwegian oil corpora-
tion that exclusively conducted business in the North Sea brought an
antitrust claim against a heavy lift barge company that operated in the
North Sea, Gulf of Mexico, and the Far East, for conspiring to fix bids
and projects.85  The oil corporation claimed, among other things, that
the conspiracy forced it to charge higher prices for the crude oil ex-
ported to the United States.86  The Fifth Circuit, after analyzing the
statutory language, legislative history, and the sparse case law, held
the second part of “the FTAIA requires more than a ‘close relation-
ship’ between the domestic injury and the plaintiff’s claim.”87  Thus,
even though the price-fixing and bid rigging satisfied the “direct, sub-
stantial, and reasonably foreseeable” requirement because of the in-
flated prices to U.S. consumers, these inflated prices failed to satisfy
the “gives rise” requirement.88  The higher prices U.S. consumers paid
for the defendant’s services in the Gulf of Mexico did not give rise to
the oil corporation’s claim because the plaintiff oil corporation con-
ducted business exclusively in the North Sea.89  Judge Higginbotham
81. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 817 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Proscriptive comity is the “respect
sovereign nations afford each other by limiting the reach of their laws.” Id.
82. Id. at 820.
83. Riazi, supra note 2, at 1314–16. R
84. Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2001).
85. Id. at 422.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 427–29 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 421–22, 425–26.
89. Id. at 426–27.
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dissented and argued that the majority interpreted the plain statutory
language incorrectly when they narrowly construed the requirement
that the conduct “gives rise to the plaintiff’s claim” instead of “gives
rise to a claim.”90  More importantly, he contended that public policy
necessitates a broad interpretation of the FTAIA.91  Doing so would
further the purpose of the FTAIA to protect American consumers
who may be placed at a disadvantage by potential antitrust violators.92
In Kruman v. Christie’s International PLC,93 the Second Circuit re-
versed the district court’s dismissal of the case and sided with Judge
Higginbotham’s dissent in Den Norske.  The court held that the unam-
biguous language of the FTAIA did not require that the domestic ef-
fect “gives rise to the plaintiff’s claim,” but rather “give rise to a
claim.”94  Defendants Christie’s International PLC, a corporation of
the United Kingdom, and Sotheby’s Holdings Inc., a Michigan corpo-
ration, are two of the largest auction houses in the world, together
controlling ninety-seven percent of the market.95  Kruman filed suit
alleging that both defendants agreed to fix commission rates paid by
buyers who purchased and sold goods in auctions outside the United
States.96  The court rejected the defendants’ assertion that a holding
against them would open the floodgates of litigation, and it reasoned
that policy considerations should not justify a different reading of the
statute.97  It held that the statute is unambiguous in stating what kind
of conduct can be brought before U.S. courts.98  Furthermore, the
court rejected the defendants’ contention that because of the global-
ized economy, any anticompetitive conduct could conceivably impact
U.S. commerce.99  The court held that the FTAIA’s language already
provides for a limitation on the reach of U.S. antitrust laws by requir-
ing “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect.”100
The Seventh Circuit addressed the FTAIA for the first time in
United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chemical. Co.101  The case involved
2-Amino-1 Butanol (AB), a key ingredient in the production of
90. Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 433 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 434.
92. Id.
93. Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002).
94. Id. at 399.
95. Id. at 390.
96. Id. at 390–91, 393.
97. Id. at 402.
98. Id.
99. Kruman, 284 F.3d at 402.
100. Id.
101. United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc),
overruled by Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012).
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“Ethambutol,” a primary pharmaceutical used in the treatment of tu-
berculosis.102  Plaintiffs were Indian companies that were previous de-
fendants in a prior trade-secret litigation.103  The plaintiffs alleged that
the defendants cost them profits they could have earned had Angus
Chemical, a subsidiary of an American company, not used anticompe-
titive means to impede their plans to sell AB in the United States.104
The court, just like the earlier courts, analyzed the legislative history
to determine how the “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
effect” language of the Act must be interpreted.105  It also considered
policy reasons for exercising the prevailing approach of exercising ju-
risdiction.106  Particularly, it emphasized the need to “tread softly” in
extending the reach of U.S. antitrust laws, as they could affect the
United States’ relationship with other governments.107  Ultimately,
the court held that the miniscule presence of AB in the United States,
most of which was not used to make drugs, did not constitute such a
“substantial” effect as the statute requires.108
One year later, in United States v. LSL Biotechnologies,109 the Ninth
Circuit analyzed what the statutory term “direct” means, as used in
the first part of the FTAIA test.110  LSL Biotechnologies, an Ameri-
can corporation that develops and markets seeds, entered into an
agreement with Hazera, a foreign company that develops genetically
modified tomatoes with a longer shelf-life than regular tomatoes.111
The United States’ complaint centered on LSL’s breach of a restric-
tive clause in the agreement, which barred Hazera from entering into
other agreements with other American companies after its contract
with LSL terminated.112  The government reasoned that the seventy
percent market share the defendants held, and the presence of the
restrictive clause, unreasonably restrained competition.113  As a result,
the United States alleged that the clause allowed defendants to artifi-




105. Id. at 947–52.
106. Id. at 952.
107. United Phosphorus, 322 F.3d at 952.
108. Id. at 952–53.
109. United States v. LSL Biotechs., 379 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2004).
110. Id. at 679.
111. Id. at 674.
112. Id. at 675.
113. Id.  “Market share” is a company’s percentage share of an industry’s or a market’s total
sales over a specific time period. Market Share, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/m/marketshare.asp (last visited Aug. 11, 2016).  It is calculated by dividing a company’s
sales by the industry’s total sales in a given time period. Id.
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American consumers.114  Relying on a U.S. Supreme Court case, the
Ninth Circuit held that the effects alleged by the government were not
“direct,” as they did not follow as an “immediate consequence of the
defendant’s activity.”115  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that an effect
could not be “direct” when there are “intervening developments” be-
tween the alleged conduct and the effects of that conduct.116  In par-
ticular, the Ninth Circuit held that the government’s assertions that
the restrictive clause between LSL Biotechnologies and Hazera will
more likely hamper development of high-quality tomatoes and may
allow LSL to charge more for their seeds did not rise to the level of
“direct” to satisfy the FTAIA.117
The most recent U.S. Supreme Court decision regarding the reach
of the Sherman Act and the FTAIA was in F. Hoffman-La Roche v.
Empagran.118  Five foreign purchasers filed a class action lawsuit
against multiple large drug manufacturers and distributors, alleging
that the defendants engaged in an over-arching worldwide conspiracy
to raise, stabilize, and maintain the prices of vitamins affecting virtu-
ally every market where they operated, creating adverse effects in the
United States and other nations.119  Justice Breyer delivered the unan-
imous opinion of the Court and based the holding on international
comity and legislative history considerations.120  First, the Court held
that the ambiguous statute must be interpreted to “avoid unreasona-
ble interference with the sovereign authority of other nations,” and
that doing so would harmonize the disfavored extraterritorial applica-
tion of U.S. antitrust law.121  It stressed that a worldwide jurisdiction
of U.S. antitrust laws would open U.S. courts to plaintiffs who were
unhappy with remedies made available by their own legal systems.122
Second, the Court held that Congress intended to limit the extraterri-
torial reach of the Sherman Act, shown through its enactment of the
FTAIA; the “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on
domestic commerce was Congress’ way of limiting, and not expanding,
the scope of the application of the Sherman Act.123  Therefore, activi-
ties that caused solely foreign harm are specifically excluded from the
114. LSL Biotechs., 379 F.3d at 676.
115. Id. at 680 (citing Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992)).
116. LSL Biotechs., 379 F.3d at 681.
117. Id.
118. 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
119. Id. at 159–60.
120. Id. at 158, 173.
121. Id. at 163–65.
122. Id. at 166–67.
123. Id. at 156, 159.
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scope of U.S. antitrust laws.124  In effect, even though the FTAIA ex-
cludes foreign activities from the Sherman Act, the “direct, substan-
tial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” part of the statute brings those
foreign activities back to its reach.125
The Third Circuit clarified what the FTAIA exception entails in
Animal Science Products, Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp. without fo-
cusing too much on the policy considerations emphasized in Em-
pagran.126  The plaintiffs were domestic purchasers of magnesite, a
chemical used among other things to melt steel, make cement, and
clean wastewater.127  They alleged that Chinese producers and export-
ers conspired to fix the prices of magnesite exported and sold in the
United States, in violation of the Sherman Act.128  The Third Circuit
held that courts should look into whether the alleged conduct was di-
rected at a U.S. import market, regardless of whether goods were im-
ported into the United States, or whether defendants were importers
themselves.129  Moreover, it emphasized that the standard is an objec-
tive one; thus, the “requisite ‘direct’ and ‘substantial’ effect must have
been ‘foreseeable’ to an objectively reasonable person.”130  The case
was remanded to the lower court, with instructions that the “reasona-
bly foreseeable” standard should be analyzed by determining
“whether the alleged domestic effect would have been evident to a
reasonable person making practical business judgments.”131  On re-
mand, the district court dismissed the claim after finding that the com-
plaint did not provide the required specific factual allegations of the
connection between the plaintiffs’ purchases and the alleged anticom-
petitive conduct.132
In Minn-Chem Inc. v. Agrium Inc., the Seventh Circuit faced similar
questions.133  Minn-Chem was a U.S. company that purchased potash,
a homogenous commodity, from foreign suppliers.134  Its complaint al-
leged that the defendants, foreign suppliers and distributors of potash,
formed a cartel that reduced supply and increased prices.135  Those
agreed-upon prices eventually became benchmarks for sales to Amer-
124. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 169–70.
125. Id.
126. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2011).
127. Id. at 464 & n.1.
128. Id. at 464.
129. Id. at 470.
130. Id. at 471.
131. Id.
132. Animal Sci. Prod., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 34 F. Supp. 3d 465 (D.N.J. 2014).
133. Minn-Chem Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012).
134. Id. at 848.
135. Id. at 848–49.
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ican purchasers.136  The court agreed with the plaintiffs that United
Phosphorus was “ripe for reconsideration” of the Seventh Circuit’s
previous holding that the FTAIA imposed a jurisdictional limit, in-
stead of establishing an element of a Sherman Act claim.137  After
concluding that the language of the statute and procedural implica-
tions of the FTAIA outline an element of a claim, the court turned to
analyze whether the defendants satisfied the first requirement of the
FTAIA.138  The United States is one of the two largest consumers of
potash, and the effects of the supply restriction and the associated
price increases of the product satisfied the “direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable” requirement of the statute.139
Despite the various breakthroughs in interpreting the FTAIA,
available case law still has not answered some fundamental questions
regarding the reach of the statute.  The Ninth and Seventh Circuits
attempted to solve the mystery as to when a foreign company’s extra-
territorial conduct falls within the purview of U.S. courts.140  As will
be explained in this Comment, despite the similar facts of both cases,
a circuit split has emerged yet again.141
D. Ninth Circuit and Seventh Circuit Split: Same Conspiracy
Product, Different Outcomes
This Section discusses the Ninth and Seventh Circuit’s inexplicable
and directly adverse conflict in United States v. Hui Hsiung and Mo-
torola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp.142  The products dis-
cussed in both cases are the same: LCD panels used for the creation of
electronics.143  The conspiracy, likewise, was the same: Taiwanese and
Korean electronics manufacturers colluded to set the price of these
LCD panels.144  These LCD panels came under U.S. jurisdiction
through finished electronic products.145  The Ninth Circuit applied the
FTAIA broadly and held that the manufacturers were liable because
their conduct affected U.S. commerce.146  On the other hand, the Sev-
136. Id. at 849.
137. Id. at 852.
138. Id. at 853.
139. See Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 849–60.
140. See United States v. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2015); Motorola Mobility LLC v.
AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2015).
141. See infra notes 142–94 and accompanying text. R
142. Compare Motorola, 775 F.3d at 816, with Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d at 738.
143. Compare Motorola, 775 F.3d at 817, with Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d at 742.
144. Motorola, 775 F.3d at 817; Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d at 742–43.
145. Motorola, 775 F.3d at 817; Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d at 742–43.
146. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d at 760.
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enth Circuit held that the manufacturers’ conduct was too remote to
satisfy the narrow interpretation of the FTAIA.147
1. Broad Rule: Ninth Circuit’s Ruling in United States v. Hui
Hsiung
Hui Hsiung, a criminal antitrust case, involved an international con-
spiracy between Taiwanese and Korean electronics manufacturers of
Liquid Crystal Display (LCDs) panels.148  The defendants were AU
Optronics (AUO), a Taiwanese company, AU Optronics of America
(AUOA), AUO’s retailer and wholly-owned subsidiary, Hsuan Bin
Chen the President of AUO, and Hui Hsiung the Executive Vice Pres-
ident of AUO.149  For five years, the defendants created and func-
tioned as a cartel by secretly holding meetings called “Crystal
Meetings” in Taiwan to “set[ ] the target price” and “stabilize the
price” of LCDs.150  These LCDs were sold to U.S. companies such as
Dell, Hewlett Packard (HP), Compaq, Apple, and Motorola.151  Re-
ports that were produced after the Crystal Meetings were called
“Crystal Meeting Reports.”152  These reports provided for pricing
targets that were used by retailers as the minimum price of selling
panels to wholesale customers, including U.S. companies.153  The
United States made up one-third of the personal computer market; as
a result, the defendants made enormous profits.154  In effect, the U.S.
wholesale customers, such as bellwether companies Dell, Compaq,
and HP, had no choice but to accept the set prices.155  Consequently,
the increase in price was passed on to smaller consumers who bought
electronics such as personal computers and cellphones.156  The United
States Department of Justice (DOJ) initiated proceedings.157  The
conspiracy ended after five years when the FBI raided the offices of
AUOA in Houston, Texas.158
The reach of the Sherman Act and the FTAIA was a major conten-
tion in the Ninth Circuit proceedings.159  Hui Hsiung contended that
147. Motorola, 775 F.3d at 819.
148. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d at 742.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 743 (alteration in original).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 743.
154. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d at 743.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. Id. at 741–42.
158. Id. 742.
159. Id. at 744.
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the company was not an importer per se, but rather that a third party
(e.g., Motorola) was the one that imported the manufactured
cellphones into the country.160  Therefore, Hui Hsiung argued that the
Sherman Act could not be applied.161  Moreover, because the defend-
ants argued that they should not be subjected to U.S. antitrust laws,
the overseas conduct was not sufficient for the “direct” requirement
under the FTAIA.162  On the contrary, the government contended
that Hui Hsiung’s intentional and deliberate actions affected U.S.
commerce and was sufficient to satisfy the “direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable” test of the FTAIA.163  At trial, voluminous
evidence was presented regarding the defendants’ involvement in the
Crystal Meetings, their sales of LCDs to customers in the United
States, and expert testimony regarding the financial impact of the de-
fendants’ conduct.164  Ultimately, the jury found the defendants guilty
of violating the Sherman Act by conspiring to fix the LCD prices.165
The indictment alleged that the defendants derived profits of approxi-
mately $500 million from the conspiracy.166  The defendants moved
for an acquittal, contending that the government had failed to prove
an exception to FTAIA that the alleged conduct had an “intended and
substantial effect on United States commerce.”167
The Ninth Circuit analyzed all of the defendants’ challenges.168  The
court, after applying the substantial effects test of Hartford Fire, held
that discussion and regular communication between the foreign de-
fendants and their U.S. subsidiaries counted as “import commerce,”
falling squarely within the Sherman Act; thus, the FTAIA need not be
analyzed.169  It determined that because the defendants targeted the
United States and sold millions of the products at a fixed price, the
conduct “substantially” affected U.S. commerce.170  It also found that
the circumstances surrounding the conspiracy all pointed to an “im-
mediate consequence” to United States commerce; an increase in
price of one component would also increase the price of the final
160. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d at 756.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 758.
163. Id. at 756.
164. Id. at 744.
165. Id. at 745.
166. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d at 744.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 750–51.
169. Id. at 756.
170. Id. at 750–51.
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product.171  Therefore, the conduct was sufficiently within the reach of
the Sherman Act.172
The United States government argued for the domestic effects the-
ory, which required the court to analyze whether the government pled
and proved the requirements of the domestic effects exception of the
FTAIA, particularly whether the defendants’ conduct had a “direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on U.S. commerce.173
Relying on LSL Biotechnologies, the defendants argued that because
there were intervening steps, such as the development and manufac-
ture of the products prior to the sale into the United States, the effects
of the alleged conspiracy to domestic commerce had been “dif-
fuse[d].”174  The court recognized that “the government’s expert cre-
ated some ambiguity regarding the exact flow of how panels go from
the plants of the Crystal Meeting participants into a product.”175  Nev-
ertheless, it used a proximate causation standard, and it found that the
LCDs in question were a substantial cost component of the finished
products; they made up seventy to eighty percent in monitors and
thirty to forty percent in notebook computers.176  Accordingly, the
court found that when the price of these panels went up, it was inevi-
table that the price of the finished product also went up.177  In light of
the globalized economy, the Ninth Circuit also mentioned that it is
“not uncommon that the orders placed with system integrators were
based on custom orders from United States customers for direct ship-
ment to that customer.”178  For all these reasons, the court concluded
that the “integrated, close, and direct connection between the
purchase of the price-fixed panels, the United States as the destination
for the products, and the ultimate inflation of prices in finished prod-
ucts imported to the United States” had a “direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable” effect on United States commerce.179  Thus,
the defendants were liable, regardless of whether the Ninth Circuit
analyzed the case under either the Sherman Act or the FTAIA.180
171. Id. at 759.
172. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d at 754.
173. Id. at 756.
174. Id. at 758 (citing United States v. LSL Biotechs., 379 F.3d 672, 680–81 (9th Cir. 2004)).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 759.
177. Id.
178. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d at 759.
179. Id. at 759–60.
180. Id. at 743.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-1\DPL107.txt unknown Seq: 18 18-APR-17 9:35
192 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:175
2. Narrow Rule: Seventh Circuit’s Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU
Optronics Corp.
The Seventh Circuit ruled differently in a factually similar case.  In
Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., Motorola accused
AU Optronics, a defendant in Hui Hsiung, of price-fixing when it sold
LCD panels to Motorola, its foreign subsidiaries, and other U.S.-
based companies.181  Forty-two percent of these LCDs were pur-
chased by foreign companies and passed through an “extended, multi-
step foreign supply chain that ended with their incorporation into
cellphones at foreign factories.”182  These cellphones were eventually
shipped to Motorola for sale; only one percent of the panels were di-
rectly purchased by Motorola’s foreign subsidiaries.183  The other
fifty-seven percent, on the other hand, did not enter domestic com-
merce; they were incorporated into products that were sold abroad.184
The Seventh Circuit first found that the transactions of the defendants
did not rise to the level of “import commerce” to be analyzed under
the Sherman Act.185  It then found that even though the conspiracy
had some effect within the United States, it was too indirect or remote
to satisfy the “direct effects” test of the FTAIA.186  It reasoned that
the price-fixing did not have any effect on prices in the United States
because the cartel price would have been what Motorola charged, re-
gardless of whether the alleged conspiracy were true.187  Furthermore,
the effect of the alleged price fixing was mediated because Motorola
ultimately decided the retail price of the cellphone.188  Consequently,
the “effects” of defendant’s practice did not give rise to an antitrust
claim, having failed to pass the second exemption of the statute.189
The Seventh Circuit also considered the remedies Motorola’s for-
eign subsidiaries had in countries where they were incorporated, the
prevalence of importing products into the United States containing
components that producers had bought from foreign manufacturers,
and the “serious risk of interfer[ing]” with a foreign nation indepen-
dently regulating its own commercial affairs.190  Ultimately, the court
181. Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816, 817 (7th Cir. 2015).
182. Brief for Respondents in Opposition at 6, Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics
Corp., 135 S. Ct. 2837 (2015) (mem.) (No. 14-1122), 2015 WL 2375815, at *6.
183. Motorola, 775 F.3d at 817.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 818–19.
186. Id. at 819.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Motorola, 775 F.3d at 820–21.
190. Id. at 824 (quoting F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
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concluded that due to all of these considerations, Motorola did not
succeed in its allegations.  The Seventh Circuit’s opinion is irreconcila-
ble with the Ninth Circuit’s ruling.191
The conflict between these two circuit courts “could not be
sharper.”192  “The two cases dealt with the same products, same con-
spiracy, and the same FTAIA provisions”; and yet, the Ninth and Sev-
enth Circuits arrived at opposite conclusions.193  The Ninth Circuit
held that a foreign company’s anticompetitive conduct that affects the
prices of goods sold in the United States is sufficient for a U.S. anti-
trust claim, while the Seventh Circuit ruled narrowly by requiring a
tighter nexus between the alleged conduct of a foreign company with
its effect on the United States.194  These differing conclusions pose a
threat to the stability of U.S. antitrust laws and must immediately be
resolved, either though the other circuit courts’ adoption of one rule
or the Supreme Court’s intervention.
III. ANALYSIS
This Part discusses the differences between the reasoning of the
Seventh and Ninth Circuits by considering their application of existing
case law and analyzing their relevant arguments.  First, this Part lays
out why an established rule is necessary in light of today’s global econ-
omy.195  Second, this Part discusses the differing arguments of both
the Seventh and Ninth Circuits and the merits of their arguments.196
Third, this Part proposes which of the two opinions advances a
stronger and more apt interpretation of the FTAIA in today’s global
economy, and finally it argues why U.S. courts, including the U.S. Su-
preme Court, should apply the Ninth Circuit’s “broad” interpretation
in subsequent cases.197
191. Id. at 825.
192. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Hui Hsiung v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2837 (2015)
(mem.) (No. 14-1121), 2015 WL 1201366, at *3.
193. J. Taylor Kirklin & Deirdre A. McEvoy, Supreme Court Surprises the Antitrust World
with Denial of Cert in Motorola and AU Optronics, PATTERSON BELKNAP WEBB & TYLER LLP:
ANTITRUST UPDATE (June 15, 2015), http://www.antitrustupdateblog.com/blog/supreme-court-
surprises-antitrust-world-denial-cert-motorola-au-optronics/.
194. Compare United States v. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d 738, 756 (9th Cir. 2015), with Motorola,
775 F.3d at 821.
195. See infra notes 198–237 and accompanying text. R
196. See infra notes 238–90 and accompanying text. R
197. See infra notes 291–373 and accompanying text. R
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A. The Need for an Established Rule
The FTAIA was enacted to “clarify” the Sherman Act’s application
to transactions that affect U.S. commerce, yet the circuit courts have
not come to a consensus as to how it must be consistently inter-
preted.198  Similarly, despite the circuit splits that have overwhelmed
the judicial system, the U.S. Supreme Court has only interpreted the
FTAIA once, in Empagran.199  The Court at that time, however, did
not answer the critical question embodied in Hui Hsiung and Motor-
ola: whether the FTAIA applies to transactions made outside of the
United States but eventually have an impact upon U.S. competition,
commerce, and consumers.200
The indistinguishable facts of Hui Hsiung and Motorola and the ir-
reconcilable rulings call for a consistent rule across the circuit courts
and intervention by the U.S. Supreme Court.201  Both cases involved
the price-fixing of LCD panels by foreign entities, whose manufac-
tured products eventually reached the United States.202  Yet, the Sev-
enth and Ninth Circuits disagreed on what constitutes “import trade”
or “import commerce.”203  The Seventh Circuit held that in order to
be liable, a defendant must be engaged as an importer, who directly
sells goods into the United States.204  Accordingly, it ruled that the
one percent of LCDs sold directly to Motorola were too attenuated to
become “import trade” under the Sherman Act;205 the remaining
forty-two percent of LCDs, which Motorola’s foreign subsidiaries
bought from the defendants, were too “remote” under FTAIA.206  In
complete contrast, the Ninth Circuit held that any conduct consum-
mated within an import market qualifies as either “import trade” or
“import commerce.”207  This meant that the defendants did not have
to import any goods themselves, but only needed to have engaged in
conduct within the import business to satisfy both the Sherman Act
and the FTAIA.208  Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that the de-
fendants, although not the per se importers of the LCD panels, were
198. Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 6, Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 135
S. Ct. 2837 (2015) (mem.) (No. 14-1122), 2015 WL 33979577, at *6.
199. Id.; see also F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
200. Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 198, at 3. R
201. Id.
202. Compare United States v. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 2015), with Motorola
Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2015).
203. Compare Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d at 756, with Motorola, 775 F.3d at 821.
204. Motorola, 775 F.3d at 818–19.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d at 756.
208. Id.
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liable under either the Sherman Act or the FTAIA for engaging in
business that affected the finished products that were sold into the
United States.209
These two contrasting rulings have placed not only the defend-
ants—but also other foreign companies doing business with the
United States—in a precarious position.210  These two cases represent
the frequently recurring question of how to interpret the FTAIA.211
Foreign companies that do business, directly or indirectly, want clear
guidance on how their business practices could be subjected to U.S.
antitrust laws.212  No company will want to risk breaking the law in
one jurisdiction, yet be absolved in the other.213  A clear ruling across
all federal courts will be beneficial to international antitrust enforce-
ment and the domestic economy, especially with the continuous ex-
pansion of global supply chains.214
A “supply chain” is defined as “a network between a company and
its suppliers to produce and distribute a specific product, and the sup-
ply chain represents the steps it takes to get the product or service to
the customer.”215  It essentially “encompasses each step from the sup-
plier to the final consumer.”216  Establishing global supply chains
across the world has become a strategy of companies in today’s global-
ized economy.217  Global supply chains have played an important role
in the end-to-end production of goods sought by consumers across the
world.218  In today’s globalized economy, companies use this practice
to source, manufacture, transport, and distribute products internation-
ally.219  For example, televisions are manufactured in China using dis-
plays from Taiwan and Korea.220  These televisions eventually find
209. Id.
210. Brief of the Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. as Amici Curiae in Support of Granting Certiorari at 1,
Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 135 S. Ct. 2837 (2015) (mem.) (No. 14-1122),
2015 WL 1798939, at *1.
211. Id.
212. James J. O’Connell, Antitrust and the Limits of Globalization, ANTITRUST, Spring 2015,
at 4, 6.
213. Id. at 6.
214. Brief of the Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., supra note 210, at 2. R
215. Supply Chain, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/marketshare.asp
(last visited Aug. 11, 2016).




220. See Julie Hopkins, Why Americans Don’t Make Televisions Anymore, DETROIT NEWS
(Oct. 22, 2014, 12:06 AM), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/opinion/2014/10/22/americans-
make-tvs/17680951/.
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their way into various countries, including the United States.221  Due
to this multi-step process, many businesses that utilize global supply
chains become victims of anticompetitive activity by foreign cartels.222
In fact, price-fixing conspiracies have cost consumers more than $1
trillion over the last twenty-five years.223  Needless to say, the United
States, holding a huge market share of these products, should protect
these supply chains to some degree through the enactment and execu-
tion of an understandable U.S. antitrust law.224
The manufacturing industry, in particular, contributes more than
$1.8 trillion annually to the U.S. economy and “employs nearly twelve
million men and women.”225  The goods sold by foreign intermediaries
eventually find their way into the United States, some of which may
be used to further domestic manufacturing.226  For example, in 2014,
approximately $2.8 trillion of goods were imported into the United
States.227  This amount has more than doubled in the last fifteen
years.228  Most of these imports act as intermediate inputs on produc-
tivity used for other businesses in the United States.229  For example,
in 2006, over ten percent of intermediate inputs accounted for im-
ported intermediaries used by private industries.230  Without a doubt,
the question presented in these two cases is of tremendous economic
significance to U.S. manufacturers and the United States as a whole.
The harm of the price-fixing conspiracy from these two cases alone
has affected well over $23.5 billion in sales of LCD panels imported
into the United States, either as raw materials or as components of
finished products.231  Manufacturers have had to absorb the artificially
high costs of the LCD panels as they incorporate the component LCD
panels into finished products, and they ultimately pass those artifi-
221. Id.
222. Smith, supra note 34, at 2063. R
223. John M. Connor, The Private International Cartels (PIC) Data Set: Guide and Summary
Statistics, 1990-2013, at 23 (Aug. 9, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2478271.
224. Id. at 24.
225. Brief of the Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., supra note 210, at 1. R
226. Id. at 1–2.
227. Annual Trade Highlights, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/
statistics/highlights/annual.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2016).
228. U.S. Trade in Goods and Services - Balance of Payments (BOP) Basis, U.S. CENSUS BU-
REAU, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/historical/gands.pdf (last visited Aug. 11,
2016).
229. Brief of the Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., supra note 210, at 6. R
230. Lucy P. Eldridge & Michael J. Harper, Effects of Imported Immediate Inputs on Produc-
tivity, MONTHLY LAB. REV., June 2010, at 3, 5.
231. United States v. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d 738, 759 (9th Cir. 2015).
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cially inflated costs on to U.S. consumers.232  Price-sensitive consum-
ers, in return, may have refused to purchase these more expensive
products, altering the demand-supply market and impacting the com-
panies’ bottom lines.
The lack of an established rule—highlighted by the circuit split in
interpreting the FTAIA—has effectively made it burdensome for
companies to develop transactions for goods intended for eventual im-
port into the United States.  This issue does not apply only to the
manufacturing industry.233  Companies engaging in transactions with
the United States, whether directly or indirectly, need to know the
possible effects of their decisions.234  Given that corporations engage
in multitudinous transactions, it is highly important and necessary for
companies to know precisely how these transactions could create fi-
nancial and legal risks/consequences.235  The costs associated with the
uncertainty create a burden to producers, causing them to increase
product prices to offset the risks.236  These higher prices could then be
passed on to U.S. consumers, which would negatively impact the U.S.
economy.237
Having highlighted the importance of an established rule, certiorari
to the U.S. Supreme Court and a consistent ruling across the courts
are warranted.  Providing clarity on how to interpret FTAIA would
(1) resolve the conflict between the circuits regarding the scope of the
“import commerce” clause of the Sherman Act; (2) clarify how “di-
rect, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effects” of the FTAIA
must be interpreted; (3) recognize and fix the ubiquitous nature of
component price fixing abroad; (4) deter the formation of more car-
tels adversely impacting the United States; and (5) keep up with the
growing demands of the international business community.
232. Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816, 821–22 (7th Cir. 2014).
233. Ryan A. Haas, Comment, Act Locally, Apply Globally: Protecting Consumers from Inter-
national Cartels by Applying Domestic Antitrust Law Globally, 15 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 99,
119 (2003).
234. Brief of the Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., supra note 210, at 2. R
235. Id.  As presented by the petitioners, four scenarios could arise with the lack of an estab-
lished rule:
(a) the transshipment of price–fixed goods via an overseas destination to the United
States; (b) the direct importation of price–fixed goods into the United States; (c) the
shipment of price-fixed goods to an overseas affiliate of the domestic purchaser for
incorporation into finished products delivered to the United States; and (d) the ship-
ment of price-fixed goods to an overseas affiliate of the domestic purchaser for incorpo-
ration into finished products delivered abroad.
Id. at 4.
236. Id. at 8.
237. Id.
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B. Overarching Themes of the Sherman Act and FTAIA
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits’ rulings revolved around similar
overarching themes that the other U.S. courts have attempted to re-
solve through the years.  First, this Section discusses both the Circuit
Courts’ interpretations of “import commerce,” particularly those of
the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, as to when the Sherman Act can be
applied to foreign companies’ transactions made outside of the United
States.238  Second, this Section analyzes what kinds of conduct could
successfully subject foreign companies under the FTAIA.239  Third,
this Section explores the Seventh Circuit’s analysis of its ruling under
international comity and deterrence considerations.240
1. Import Commerce Under the Sherman Act
The Seventh Circuit defined “import trade” or “import com-
merce”—two phrases to describe the same concept—as “trade involv-
ing only foreign sellers and domestic buyers.”241  Manufacturers that
directly sell goods into the United States are the only entities poten-
tially liable under the Sherman Act.242  Motorola bought only one per-
cent of the LCD panels that were sold by the defendants.243  This one
percent of purchased panels were shipped to the United States and
used to manufacture cellphones.244  Only those panels incorporated
into the cellphones sold in the United States are subject to the Sher-
man Act.245  The one percent, according to the Seventh Circuit, was
too “remote” to give rise to a Sherman Act claim.246  The court re-
fused to include the other ninety-nine percent because these were
panels that were bought by Motorola’s foreign subsidiaries.  Where
the phones were ultimately sold, in the United States or in a foreign
country, did not matter.247  It was Motorola’s foreign subsidiaries that
purchased the artificially high price of the panels.248  Therefore, the
Seventh Circuit held that Motorola and its customers were just the
238. See infra notes 241–61 and accompanying text. R
239. See infra notes 262–83 and accompanying text. R
240. See infra notes 284–90 and accompanying text. R
241. Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 855 (7th Cir. 2012).
242. Motorola, 775 F.3d at 817–18.
243. Id. at 817.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 819.
247. Id. at 817–18.
248. Motorola, 775 F.3d at 817–18.
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“indirect purchasers”; they are not within the purview of the Sherman
Act.249
Motorola argued that the forty-two percent of panels that eventu-
ally reached U.S. commerce should be treated similarly as that of the
one percent that did, even though Motorola’s foreign subsidiaries
technically purchased the LCD panels from the defendants.250  Motor-
ola contended that it, together with its foreign subsidiaries, acted and
functioned as a “single enterprise” by managing the operations of the
whole company from pricing negotiations, purchasing components,
manufacturing and distribution processes, and determining which fin-
ished products were imported and sold in the United States.251  The
Seventh Circuit rejected these arguments and held that Motorola must
not ignore its deliberate decision to structure the company the way it
did only because it will be beneficial to the company in this limited
instance.252  It reasoned that Motorola and its foreign subsidiaries are
legally separate entities; thus, only the foreign subsidiaries that di-
rectly bought from these foreign defendants would be able to sue in a
court that has jurisdiction over the companies.253  It concluded that
the relationship between a foreign plaintiff and the United States gen-
erated a minimal effect on domestic commerce, if at all.254
Relying on the Seventh and Sixth Circuits’ definitions of “import
commerce,” the Ninth Circuit, to the contrary, determined that the
allegations against the defendants were sufficient to establish their ac-
tions as “import commerce” falling squarely within the Sherman
Act.255  The defendants reached pricing agreements to import panels
into the United States after conspiring through one-on-one meetings
and phone calls with employees of the defendants and other LCD
manufacturers.256  These agreements affected over one million price-
fixed panels per month, and collectively, they generated $600 million
in revenue for the defendants.257  The court rejected the contention
that the defendants should not be held liable because they were not
importers per se.258  It was undisputed that the defendants did not
249. Id. at 819.
250. Id. at 818.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 820.
253. Id.
254. Motorola, 775 F.3d at 820.
255. United States v. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d 738, 754–56 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Minn-Chem,
Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 855 (7th Cir. 2012)); Carrier Corp. v. Outokumpu Oyj, 673
F.3d 430, 438 n.3, 440 (6th Cir. 2012).
256. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hui Hsiung, supra note 192, at 6. R
257. Id. at 19.
258. Id. at 22.
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manufacture most of the consumer products imported into the United
States.  Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the negotia-
tions between the executives of the defendants and U.S. companies
regarding the sale of panels at prices set at the Crystal Meetings were
enough to classify the conduct as “import commerce.”259
Both Circuit Courts also analyzed the defendants’ conduct under
the FTAIA.260  Under the FTAIA, the appropriate standard is
whether the anticompetitive conduct had a “direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect” on U.S. commerce (also known as the
“domestic effects” test), and whether the alleged conduct “gave rise to
a [Sherman Act] claim.”261
2. Domestic Effects and Gives Rise to a Claim Requirements of the
FTAIA
For the forty-two percent of LCD panels that were purchased by
the foreign subsidiaries, incorporated into cellphones, and subse-
quently sold to the United States, Motorola had to prove that defend-
ants’ price-fixing had a “direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect” on U.S. commerce; next, it had to show that the
alleged anticompetitive conduct gave rise to a Sherman Act claim.262
The Seventh Circuit distinguished the facts of Motorola from those
of Minn-Chem.263  According to Judge Posner, the effect of price-fix-
ing in Motorola was less direct than the effects of the conduct in Minn-
Chem, because “many layers” of the supply chain insulated the ad-
verse effects, and consequently it only caused a “few ripples” in the
United States.264  In Minn-Chem, foreign cartels colluded to drive up
the price of potash, knowing that the product was in high demand in
the United States.  The cartels subsequently sold the product to U.S.
customers.265  Unlike that case, the LCD panels bought by Motorola’s
foreign subsidiaries were incorporated into finished products before
they were sold to U.S. commerce.266  Despite this distinction, the Sev-
enth Circuit still assumed that the first requirement of the FTAIA was
259. Id. at 10; see Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d at 756.
260. Compare Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816, 827 (7th Cir.
2015), with Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d at 749.
261. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012).
262. Motorola, 775 F.3d at 818.
263. Id. at 819 (citing Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 860 (7th Cir. 2012)).
264. Id. at 819 (quoting Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 860).
265. Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 860.
266. Motorola, 775 F.3d at 819.
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satisfied, and the court proceeded with the analysis of the second
requirement.267
It is true that the cost of cellphones sold into the United States in-
creased as a result of the price-fixing conduct; however, the Seventh
Circuit noted that the price increase caused by the cartel occurred en-
tirely in foreign commerce.268  The foreign subsidiaries bought the
LCD panels from the defendants at the inflated price.269  The subsidi-
aries subsequently increased the price of the cellphones that were sold
to Motorola to compensate for this increase.270  On top of that, Mo-
torola further increased the price by “more than the increased price
charged to it by its foreign subsidiaries.”271  As a result of this set up,
according to the Seventh Circuit, Motorola may even have profited
from the price-fixing of the LCD panels.272  Consequently, the Sev-
enth Circuit held that any injury alleged by Motorola and its custom-
ers was only “derivative,” as their positions in the global supply chain
were already at a “subsequent level” of distribution.273  The court con-
cluded that the immediate victims of the defendants are Motorola’s
foreign subsidiaries, not Motorola itself.274  The price-fixing could
then not have given rise to Motorola’s claim, and therefore the
FTAIA did not apply.275
In analyzing the domestic effect theory on the defendants’ conduct,
the Ninth Circuit instead focused its attention on the meaning of “di-
rect.”276  Its prior ruling in LSL Biotechnologies gave light to this defi-
nition; an effect is “direct” if “it follow[s] ‘as an immediate
consequence’ of the defendant’s activity.”277  The court held that ap-
plying this rule, together with the undisputed facts and events sur-
rounding the conspiracy, led to the conclusion that the United States
was affected by the “immediate consequence of the price-fixing.”278
The LCDs were “a substantial cost component of the finished prod-
uct.”279  According to the Court, “[I]f the panel price goes up, then it
267. Id.
268. Id. at 820.
269. Id. at 817.
270. Id. at 819.
271. Id.
272. Motorola, 775 F.3d at 819.
273. Id. at 820–21.
274. Id. at 818.
275. Id.
276. United States v. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d 738, 758 (9th Cir. 2015).
277. Id. at 759 (quoting United States v. LSL Biotechs., 379 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 2004)).
278. Id. (quoting LSL Biotechs., 379 F.3d at 680).
279. Id.
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will directly impact the monitor set price.”280  Despite expert testi-
mony that described the ambiguous flow of how panels go from plants
into a product, the court depended on the “integrated, close and direct
connection between the purchase of the price-fixed panels, the United
States as the destination for the products, and the ultimate inflation of
prices in finished products imported to the United States” in making
its decision.281  Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit held that the evidence
presented was sufficient to satisfy the “direct” effects test of the
FTAIA, making the defendants liable.282  The Ninth Circuit did not
discuss at length the second requirement of the FTAIA.283
3. International Comity and Deterrence
Like the U.S. Supreme Court in Empagran, the Seventh Circuit
considered international comity concerns in extending the reach of the
FTAIA.284  In Empagran, the U.S. Supreme Court held that rampant
extraterritorial “application of [U.S.] laws creates a serious risk of in-
terference with a foreign nation’s ability independently to regulate its
own commercial affairs.”285  Applying this theory to Motorola, the
Seventh Circuit stated that allowing companies like Motorola to win
would allow companies to forum shop and to neglect international
comity principles established by precedent.286  The court held that
companies could find redress in foreign jurisdictions for component
price-fixing.287  The companies just need to find the appropriate juris-
diction in which to seek remedies; that jurisdiction is abroad, under
the laws of the country where they were incorporated.288  By ex-
tending the reach of the FTAIA to non-import trade, the Seventh Cir-
cuit hinted that this would presume the inadequacy of antitrust laws of
foreign countries; a presumption that would hamper the efforts other
countries, including the United States, in developing and implement-
ing adequate antitrust laws globally.289
The Ninth Circuit did not specifically discuss international comity
nor deterrence in its ruling.  Extending the reach of the FTAIA was
280. Id. (alteration in original).
281. Id.
282. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d at 756.
283. Id. at 751.
284. Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816, 818 (7th Cir. 2015).
285. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004).
286. Motorola, 775 F.3d at 821.
287. Id. at 827.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 821.
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not a concern of the court’s because it held that both the Sherman Act
and the FTAIA applied as a result of the defendants’ conduct.290
C. The Ninth Circuit Must Prevail: Apply the Broad Rule
International supply chains have benefits in today’s modern world.
Raw materials, parts, and labor costs are generally cheaper in Asia.291
Companies have more flexibility to look for other companies to trans-
act with, given the advancement in technology and the volatility of the
marketplace.292  Efficiency and effectiveness increase over time as
these companies collaborate and integrate their efforts to achieve op-
timal returns.293  Customers, generally, want cheap but quality-made
products.294  When companies meet these demands, customers are
more likely to buy the products, and as a result, other companies enter
the market with the intention of delivering the same goods at a lower
price.295  Companies, then, both cooperate and compete against each
other, finding ways to come up with final products that are more effi-
cient, eventually leading to market growth.296  However, despite these
described benefits, price-fixing cartels still find a way to impose higher
costs of products to consumers.297
A price-fixing cartel considers the product flow among regions in
order to establish the price it will charge for a particular product.298
The conspiracy, generally, will not work if the price of the product is
only increased in one region because market forces will essentially re-
allocate the sales to other regions that sell the product at lower
prices.299  For example, if the LCD conspirators focused their price
increase on regions outside of the United States, U.S. companies
would have a strong inclination towards limiting their purchases to
290. United States v. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d 738, 749, 760 (9th Cir. 2015).
291. Brief of Amicus Curiae Economists and Professors in Support of Petitioner at 24, Motor-
ola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 135 S. Ct. 2837 (2015) (mem.) (No. 14-1122), 2015 WL
1777073, at *24.
292. Noah F. Gans, Issues and Benefits of Global Supply Chain Management, BLOGSPOT: MY
REVS. & EXPERIENCES (Apr. 24, 2011, 4:49 AM), http://noahgans.blogspot.com/2011/04/global-
supply-chain-management.html.
293. Matthew B. Myers, The Many Benefits of Supply Chain Collaboration, SUPPLY CHAIN





297. See John M. Connor, Extraterritoriality of the Sherman Act and Deterrence of Private
International Cartels 7 (Purdue Univ. Dep’t of Agric. Econs. Working Paper No. 04-08, 2004),
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/28686/1/sp04-09.pdf.
298. Id.
299. Brief of Economists and Professors, supra note 291, at 6. R
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LCD panels sold in the United States at lower prices and then export-
ing these panels to foreign subsidiaries themselves, thus effectively
avoiding the cartel’s products.300  However, conspirators are savvy
enough to avoid being cut out of certain markets, particularly as the
United States is one of the largest consumer markets in the world.301
To avoid this problem, the LCD conspirators (or any international
cartel)  have an incentive to raise the prices of the products in all re-
gions that have multinational operations, including the United
States.302  This action will disrupt the efficient and organized processes
that help lower production costs, primarily because the United States
has higher than usual labor costs compared to other countries.303
With insufficient rules curtailing price-fixing cartels, U.S. companies
could limit the use of international supply chains.304  Moreover, they
will be discouraged from conducting business or moving some busi-
nesses offshore where it will be more beneficial.305  As a result, the
total price of U.S. consumer goods will be higher than it would have
been had they been created in countries that have lower production
and labor costs.306  This kind of uncertainty makes it difficult for both
producers and consumers to manage the volatility of the market.
In light of the increasing demand for international business transac-
tions, it is more important than ever that U.S. consumers are continu-
ously protected from companies’ wrongful conduct, whether or not
these companies engage in these transactions while outside of the
United States’ jurisdiction.307  The Seventh Circuit’s ruling under-
mines this protection.  It focused its analysis on technicalities of the
statute, and it placed more weight on international comity concerns
than on the protection of U.S. consumers, whom the legislators in-
tended to protect when it enacted the statute.308  On the contrary, the
Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the FTAIA is aligned more closely
with the canons of statutory interpretation.
300. Id. at 7.
301. The United States makes up twenty-nine percent of the world market. The 25 Largest
Consumer’s Markets . . . And the Outlook for 2015, INT’L BUS. DEGREE GUIDE, http://www
.internationalbusinessguide.org/25-largest-consumers-markets-outlook-2015/ (last visited Aug.
10, 2016); see also Brief of Economists and Professors, supra note 291, at 7. R
302. Brief of Economists and Professors, supra note 291, at 12–13. R
303. Id. at 27.
304. Id. at 9.
305. Id. at 25.
306. Id. at 27.
307. See Smith, supra note 34, at 2083. R
308. See supra notes 181–94 and accompanying text. R
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The Seventh Circuit’s holding that “it was Motorola, rather than the
defendants, that imported these panels into the United States”309 is
inconsistent with the legislative intent of the FTAIA.310  Congress
plainly intended to read the import-commerce exclusion broadly when
it enacted the FTAIA.311  In Hartford Fire, the U.S. Supreme Court
recognized that the “FTAIA was intended to exempt from the Sher-
man Act [1] export transactions that [2] did not injure the United
States economy.”312  The court reiterated this in Empagran when it
held that the “FTAIA seeks to make clear to American exporters . . .
that the Sherman Act does not prevent them from entering into busi-
ness arrangements . . . , however anticompetitive, as long as those ar-
rangements adversely affect only foreign markets.”313  The language
of the Sherman Act neither implies nor explicitly states that it should
only be applied when commercial transactions occurred in the United
States, and not abroad.314  This is a strained interpretation of the Act
given that Congress could have explicitly stated such a rule.315  The
Ninth Circuit, therefore, correctly dismissed the defendants’ sugges-
tion that because they were not the importers, they should not be held
liable.316
Other Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal have held in accordance
with the Ninth Circuit, suggesting that some federal courts are in
agreement with this reading of the FTAIA’s legislative intent.  In
Animal Science, the Third Circuit held that in order to find liability,
the anticompetitive behavior of the defendant must have been “di-
rected at an import market.”317  Thus, in holding this, the defendants
needed only to “function as the physical importers of goods.”318  This
meant that there was not a “necessary prerequisite” that the defend-
ants are the importers per se before antitrust laws could apply;319
309. Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816, 818 (7th Cir. 2015).
310. Smith, supra note 34, at 2093–95. R
311. The FTAIA in State Court: A Defense Perspective, LAW360 (Feb. 24, 2010, 4:45 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/149024/the-ftaia-in-state-court-a-defense-perspective.
312. Reply Brief for Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 198, at 6 (alteration in original) (quoting R
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 n.23 (1993)).
313. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 161 (2004).
314. Smith, supra note 34, at 2085. R
315. Reply Brief for Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 198, at 13. R
316. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 14–17, Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics
Corp., 135 S. Ct. 2837 (2015) (mem.) (No. 14-1122), 2015 WL 1223711, at *14–17.
317. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 470 (3d Cir. 2011)
(quoting Turicentro, S.A. v. Am. Airlines Inc., 303 F.3d 293, 303 (3d Cir. 2002), overruled by
Animal Sci., 654 F.3d at 462)).
318. Id.
319. Id.
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“[f]unctioning as a physical importer” will be sufficient.320  Here, even
though the defendants did not import the LCD panels into the United
States per se, the panels’ incorporation into the electronics that were
subsequently imported into the United States was sufficient to pass
the test.321  The defendants knew that these panels could not stand
alone, but rather must be combined with other parts to manufacture a
final product.322  That knowledge, the foreseeability of the effect to
the United States, and the intentional inflation of the price to an artifi-
cially high level meant that the defendants “functioned as a physical
importer,” falling squarely under the Sherman Act.323
With regard to the first requirement of the FTAIA, Judge Posner
for the Seventh Circuit, wrote that the domestic effect was too “re-
mote” to satisfy the “direct effects” test because the conduct occurred
abroad and then passed through a multi-step process before causing
“a few ripples in the United States.”324  However, this reasoning as-
sumes the presence of a complicated process to import the LCDs
when, in fact, there was none.325  The LCDs were purchased at a high
price, incorporated into electronics, and almost instantly shipped to
the United States.326  The process was limited to purchasing, manufac-
turing, and distribution,327 and the LCD panels have no utility without
being incorporated in various consumer products, such as mobile
phones.328  The artificially high price of the panels was the exclusive
factor that adversely impacted U.S. commerce.329  Assuming relatively
flat labor costs, the price of the final product would not have increased
had it not been for the defendants’ anticompetitive conspiracy to in-
crease the panels’ price.  The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of “direct
effects” is therefore proper.  The United States market was directly
320. Id.
321. United States v. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d 738, 756 (9th Cir. 2015).
322. Smith, supra note 34, at 2093. R
323. Michael Sennett et al., Antitrust Alert: Recent U.S. Cases May Allow New Antitrust Chal-
lenges to Foreign Conduct, JONES DAY ANTITRUST ALERT (Oct. 2011), http://www.jonesday
.com/antitrust-alert—recent-us-cases-may-allow-new-antitrust-challenges-to-foreign-conduct-10-
13-2011/.
324. Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816, 819 (7th Cir. 2015) (quot-
ing Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 860 (7th Cir. 2012)); see also Smith, supra
note 34, at 2092. R
325. Smith, supra note 34, at 2093. R
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Ellen Meriwether, Motorola Mobility and the FTAIA: If Not Here, Then Where? Anti-
trust, Spring 2015, at 8, 10.
329. Smith, supra note 34, at 2093. R
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impacted as a result of the “immediate consequence” of the defend-
ants’ price-fixing conspiracy.330
With regard to the “gives rise to” requirement of the FTAIA, the
Seventh Circuit’s opinion was sparse, despite consensus among the
other circuits.331  The Seventh Circuit relied on the argument that Mo-
torola could not recover because the injury “occurred entirely in for-
eign commerce.”332  By concluding that the defendants’ conduct did
not give rise to Motorola’s claim, the court misread the holding in
Empagran,333 in which the U.S. Supreme Court highlighted the impor-
tance of our nation’s “ability . . . to regulate its own commercial af-
fairs.”334  However, it also held that antitrust laws may be applied to
foreign anticompetitive conduct so long as it is “reasonable” and it
reflects “legislative effort to redress domestic antitrust injury that for-
eign anticompetitive conduct has caused.”335  That is exactly the issue
in Motorola.  The Seventh Circuit held that Motorola’s overcharge
claims as a result of defendants’ inflated price did not give rise to
those claims.336  It reasoned that the harm happened abroad when
Motorola purchased the price-fixed panels, independent of the in-
creased cell phone prices.337  But as stated above, the artificially high
price of the LCD panels was the reason Motorola was seeking a rem-
edy.338  Had the defendants not conspired to fix the price of these
components, the final product price of the mobile phones would not
have increased; Motorola would not have been forced to pass on the
artificial price increase to U.S. consumers.339  Instead of focusing on
the linguistics the U.S. Supreme Court employed in Empagran, the
Seventh Circuit should have applied a “more natural” reading by fo-
330. United States v. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d 738, 758 (9th Cir. 2015).
331. Smith, supra note 34, at 2073, 2076; see Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d at 758; Lotes Co. v. Hon R
Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 414 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that the statutory language
“gives rise to” indicates a direct, causal, or proximate relationship); In re Dynamic Random
Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., 546 F.3d 981, 988 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the
“gives rise to” language of the domestic injury exception requires a direct or proximate causal
relationship); In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., 477 F.3d 535, 538 (8th Cir. 2007)
(holding that the statutory “gives rise to language” requires a direct or proximate causal rela-
tionship and that this standard is in accordance with the principles of prescriptive comity).  These
courts utilized the “proximate causation” standard.
332. Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816, 819 (7th Cir. 2015).
333. Brief for the Am. Antitrust Inst. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 4, 18, Motor-
ola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 135 S. Ct. 2837 (2015) (mem.) (No. 14-1122), 2015 WL
1798940, at *4, *18.
334. F. Hoffman-La Roche v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004).
335. Id.
336. Motorola, 775 F.3d at 818–19.
337. Meriwether, supra note 328, at 8. R
338. Smith, supra note 34, at 2093. R
339. Id.
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cusing on the basic purpose of the FTAIA and the Sherman Act—
protection of U.S. consumers.340  After all, it has been widely recog-
nized that, in a global economy, anticompetitive conduct can nega-
tively impact domestic markets by inflating prices paid by U.S.
commerce.341  This is an outcome that U.S. antitrust laws were created
to combat.342
The Seventh Circuit ruling also addressed policy arguments that are
pertinent in today’s global economy.  It held that foreign subsidiaries
could bring suit to seek remedies under the laws of the country where
they operated, and in light of this, the United States must not overex-
tend its reach.  Rather, it should allow foreign countries to govern
conduct that occurs exclusively within their borders.343  However, the
court failed to consider that allowing a private company to pursue
claims under U.S. antitrust law would detect and deter the formation
of cartels.344  Treble damages are available under U.S. antitrust law.345
The adversaries of this proposition argue that this would presume the
inadequacy of the antitrust laws of foreign countries.346  They argue
that foreign countries, with the help of the United States, set up their
own antitrust laws and continue to improve these laws throughout the
years; thus, these foreign laws must prevail in dealing with foreign an-
ticompetitive conduct.347  While it is true that the United States has
taken on a role to help foreign countries develop their own antitrust
laws, the Seventh Circuit’s ruling presumes that fines and criminal
prosecutions, both here and abroad, are sufficient to deter global
cartels.348
The truth is, collective laws across the nations are still inadequate to
protect U.S. companies and consumers, primarily because many na-
tions still do not have laws against international price-fixing cartels.349
In fact, only a limited number of countries allow private companies to
340. Brief for the Am. Antitrust Inst., supra note 333, at 17. R
341. Leon B. Greenfield et al., Foreign Component Cartels and the U.S. Antitrust Laws: A
First Principle Approach, ANTITRUST, Spring 2015, at 18, 19.
342. Id.
343. Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2015).
344. Brief of Amicus Curiae Economists and Professors, supra note 291, at 3. R
345. The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-
guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Jan. 19, 2017).
346. Id. at 4.
347. See Motorola, 775 F.3d at 824.
348. Meriwether, supra note 328, at 8. R
349. Brief of Amicus Curiae Economists and Professors, supra note 291, at 4–5. R
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bring private antitrust claims for damages.350  On the other hand, ex-
isting antitrust laws in many other countries are insufficient because
the penalties are significantly lower than those in the United States;
therefore, this discrepancy fails to deter foreign companies from form-
ing international price-fixing cartels.351  The financial gains from a
conspiracy far outweigh the maximum criminal and civil fines imposed
by other countries’ antitrust laws.352
The presence of price-fixing conspiracies for products such as
LCDs, automotive parts, vitamins, and DRAM illustrate these ineffec-
tive antitrust laws.353  Companies engaged in these conspiracies know
how the system works and will repeatedly participate in cartels with-
out more rigid rules in place, such as that of the Ninth Circuit’s.354
The Seventh Circuit’s logic seems misplaced when focused on the
availability (or the lack thereof) of the laws in foreign countries where
the conduct occurred.  The antitrust laws of the United States have
nothing to do with the adequacy or inadequacy of other countries’
antitrust laws.  Rather, they have everything to do with the fact that
U.S. consumers were injured.
In Empagran, the U.S. Supreme Court held that extraterritorial ap-
plication of U.S. antitrust law should be limited to balance the “legiti-
mate sovereign interests of other nations.”355  One of the fears is that
foreign plaintiffs with no relation to domestic commerce would flock
to the United States to recover damages, which would be too costly
given the already scarce judicial resources.356  The Seventh Circuit
emphasized the principle of international comity and brought up the
same concern in its Motorola opinion.357  However, the enactment of
the FTAIA, particularly the “gives rise to” requirement, already ac-
counts for this concern.358  This second requirement of the FTAIA en-
sures that all causes of action that have domestic effects to the United
350. Meriwether, supra note 328, at 13.  Even though these countries allow recovery for anti- R
trust violations, private companies are still unlikely to succeed because of stringent requirements
of proving actual damages and requiring plaintiffs to pay all court costs. Id. at 14.
351. Brief of Amicus Curiae Economists and Professors, supra note 291, at 8. R
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 9.
355. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A, 542 U.S. 155, 164–65 (2004).
356. But see Siddharth Fernandes, Note, F. Hoffmann-Laroche, Ltd. v. Empagran and the
Extraterritorial Limits of United States Antitrust Jurisdiction: Where Comity and Deterrence Col-
lide, 20 CONN. J. INT’L L. 267, 304 (2005) (discussing how courts can use the forum non con-
veniens doctrine to “filter out foreign plaintiffs who have no relation to domestic commerce”).
357. Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816, 824–25 (7th Cir. 2015).
358. Smith, supra note 34, at 2092. R
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States are the proximate causes to those effects.359  Congress, there-
fore, made sure that unnecessary suits are not filed in U.S. jurisdic-
tions, while not overstepping into another country’s interests.360  In
Motorola, it is undisputed that the defendants’ conduct had domestic
effects, as the inflated prices paid by the foreign purchases were ulti-
mately passed on to U.S consumers.361  Motorola purchased over $5
billion worth of panels, over fifty percent of which eventually entered
U.S. commerce.362  What seems to be a small increase in the price of
the panels nonetheless would have a substantial effect on the mar-
ket.363  Furthermore, the defendants were business executives en-
gaged in global supply chains.364  If they did not already, they should
have known that the artificially inflated price of these LCD panels
targeted to reach the United States (as alleged by Motorola) would
have an impact on the U.S. market.365
Moreover, it does not appear that these cases have raised serious
comity concerns; despite the DOJ’s prosecution of the foreign compa-
nies and their employees, no foreign government has stepped forward
expressing deep concerns about the overreaching enforcement of anti-
trust law.366  This is not to say that courts must forget about the impor-
tance of international comity when analyzing antitrust cases.
International comity ensures that the United States does not overstep
into foreign countries’ authority when extending the reach of U.S. an-
titrust laws.367  In fact, the United States has proactively assisted for-
eign countries in their efforts to capture more anticompetitive
conduct.368  However, despite the need to “tread softly” in this arena,
the United States must put down its foot and continue to litigate
claims of anticompetitive conduct by foreign companies, so long as the




361. Meriwether, supra note 328, at 8. R
362. Motorola, 775 F.3d at 817–18.
363. Smith, supra note 34, at 2093. R
364. Id.
365. See id.
366. Meriwether, supra note 328, at 13. R
367. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 615 (9th Cir.
1976), superseded by statute, FTAIA, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012), as recognized in McGlinchy v. Shell
Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1988) (reasoning that Congress enacted section 6a to provide
for one application of the Sherman Act).
368. See Fernandes, supra note 356, at 268–69. R
369. United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 952 (7th Cir. 2003) (en
banc), overruled by Minn-Chem Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that
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Limiting the extent of the FTAIA, as the defendants contended and
the Seventh Circuit ruled, would significantly destabilize the enforce-
ment of antitrust law—“a central safeguard for the Nation’s free mar-
ket structures,” which “is ‘as important to the preservation of
economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights
is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.’”370  The
Seventh Circuit, in ruling that a “component” is not “direct” enough
to provide sufficient basis for liability under the statute, precluded any
claim that involved components of finished goods imported into the
United States from being brought under the Sherman Act.371  In ef-
fect, the court has made a per se rule that claims based on foreign
conduct regarding a component of finished goods that eventually
reach the United States have no place in the United States’ jurisdic-
tion.372  This sweeping decision has negative ramifications in the de-
tection of cartels, the protection of U.S. consumers, and the
development of the international business community.373
The Ninth Circuit’s logic and reasoning should prevail in subse-
quent cases.  It allows for a more rigid, yet necessary, rule in the rapid
growth of the economy.  By the Ninth Circuit’s logic, foreign cartels
that harm U.S. commerce will be reached by U.S. antitrust laws.
Treble damages will disincentivize these foreign companies from pur-
suing anticompetitive conduct; products will not be overpriced as a
result of cartels’ price-fixing; transactions among domestic and/or for-
eign producers will be much smoother because both parties are at
ease.  U.S. Supreme Court involvement, interpreting how the FTAIA
applies to non-import trade, would provide answers to questions that
federal courts have been struggling to answer for many years, and it
would reverberate the United States’ firm position against conspira-
cies that adversely impact U.S. consumers and the U.S. economy.
IV. IMPACT: THE FTAIA’S EXPANDED REACH MORE
EFFECTIVELY DETERS ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT
AND PROTECTS CONSUMERS
Anticompetitive activity of cartels and the globalization of com-
merce have exponentially accelerated the gap between buyers and
the “FTAIA’s criteria relate to the merits of a claim, and not the subject-matter jurisdiction of
the court”).
370. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1109 (2015) (quoting United
States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972)).
371. Meriwether, supra note 328, at 8. R
372. Id.
373. Id.
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sellers.374  Collectively, increasing poverty, the decline in median in-
come, and the collusion of companies to sell products at a certain
price put buyers at the mercy of these cartels.375  Sometimes, because
the products are inelastic, consumers have no choice but to accept the
inflated purchase price.376  As global supply chains continue to ex-
pand, business transactions become a source of potential victims by
perpetrators of consumer fraud.377  This raises the need for stricter
rules to protect the consumers who are more likely in a worse finan-
cial position than that of companies taking advantage of these con-
sumers.  Expanding the reach of the FTAIA to include transactions
made outside of the United States but nonetheless have an impact to
U.S. commerce, as held by the Ninth Circuit, will reduce this prevalent
issue.378  This Part discusses the effects of this proposal to the protec-
tion of U.S. consumers and the international business community.
In today’s global economy, it is difficult to distinguish and separate
foreign from domestic effects.379  Global supply chains have made it
easier for products to move rapidly and with ease.  The United States,
holding twenty-one percent of the worldwide Gross Domestic Product
(GDP), is most susceptible to cartel targeting.380  With twenty-nine
percent market share, it is the largest consumer in the world.381  Any
impact of collusion in the international market is intertwined with a
harm to customers in the United States.382  Measures must be taken to
ensure that markets remain open and competitive; no company should
able to dominate and restrict the supply of products sold.  With a rigid
rule in place, formation of domestic and international cartels would
decline, further strengthening competition.383  After all, the protection
374. Haas, supra note 233, at 99–100. R
375. Riazi, supra note 2, at 1322. R
376. “Inelastic” products are those whose demand remains relatively stable despite the
change in price. See Michelle Dwyer, What Is the Difference Between Price Elasticity and Inelas-
ticity?, CHRON, http://smallbusiness.chron.com/difference-between-price-elasticity-inelasticity-
74240.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2016).  Conversely, “elastic” products are those that have bigger
dependence on the change in price; a change in price causes a bigger change in demand. Id.
Examples include gasoline, cigarettes, and Apple products. See Tejvan Pettinger, Examples of
Elasticity, ECON. HELP (May 4, 2014), http://www.economicshelp.org/blog/7019/economics/exam
ples-of-elasticity/.
377. See Smith, supra note 34, at 2087. R
378. See Haas, supra note 233, at 104. R
379. Fernandes, supra note 356, at 316. R
380. Id.
381. The 25 Largest Consumer’s Markets, supra note 301. R
382. Fernandes, supra note 356, at 316. R
383. See id. at 302–04.
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of consumers through the preservation of deterrence is one of the
main focuses of antitrust laws.384
Courts, as well as scholars, have commented that cartel deterrence
should be the primary concern over international comity issues in ana-
lyzing the FTAIA.385  In United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co.,386
the First Circuit concluded that principles of comity should not
“shield” a defendant from any intentional wrongdoings, especially if a
substantial effect occurred in U.S. markets.387  Otherwise, because
cartel members are more likely to engage in anticompetitive conduct,
a decision that is based more heavily on the international comity prin-
ciple would make company transactions, domestic and abroad, confus-
ing and ultimately increase the burden on consumers.388
Cartels, more often than not, operate in secrecy.  Members can co-
ordinate and collude to fix prices outside of U.S. jurisdiction, making
it much more difficult for the U.S. government to detect and prose-
cute them.389  To achieve deterrence, a rule that will dissuade compa-
nies from engaging in anticompetitive conduct from the very
beginning will allow antitrust enforcement to be more manageable.390
A cartel will most likely weigh the potential damages engaging in an-
ticompetitive activities with the potential benefits of those anticompe-
titive activities.391  A study conducted in the United Kingdom showed
that labor productivity declined when industries are characterized by
collusion or when competition is low.392  The study showed, however,
that once a strict antitrust law was enforced, the gap declined, if not
disappeared.393
The presence of competition drives productivity by incentivizing
companies to be more efficient.394  Studies have revealed that compe-
tition boosts product innovation and creativity, all while firms strive to
reduce their costs, by encouraging them to produce higher-quality and
384. Id. at 295.
385. Id. at 268.
386. United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997).
387. Id. at 8; see Fernandes, supra note 356, at 285. R
388. See Fernandes, supra note 356, at 272. R
389. Id. at 311.
390. See Pfizer Inc. v. Gov’t of India, 434 U.S. 308, 315 (1978) (“If foreign plaintiffs were not
permitted to seek a remedy for their antitrust injuries,” it is likely that companies would “enter
into anticompetitive conspiracies affecting American consumers.”).
391. Fernandes, supra note 356, at 313. R
392. Markus Kitzmuller & Martha Martinez Licetti, Competition Policy: Encouraging Thriv-
ing Markets for Development, VIEWPOINT, Sept. 2012, at 6, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
EXTFINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/282884-1303327122200/VP331-Competition-Policy.pdf.
393. Id. at 3–45.
394. See id. at 3.
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more diverse goods and services at more competitive prices.395  Con-
sumers will gain more access to markets they had not previously been
exposed to as a result of commercial competition.396
Cartels limit the presence of competition in the economy.397  Once
producers work together to protect their own interests, to the detri-
ment of consumers, competition is eliminated.398  Cartel members ei-
ther agree on a fixed price at which to sell certain products or restrict
the quantity of output of the product released into the market.399  By
deliberately restricting the output released into the market, without a
natural shift in the consumers’ demand, the supply decreases, thereby
increasing the price of the product.400  When most of the producers in
an industry are part of a cartel, consumers will have no means to find
a substitute, and they will have no choice but to accept the inflated
price.401  For example, when AU Optronics and other defendants col-
luded to artificially set the price of the LCD panels, Motorola and
other plaintiffs had no choice but to subsequently increase the price of
their own products that used these LCD panels.402  Without the cartel-
priced LCD panels, Motorola’s foreign subsidiaries would have been
able to buy them at the market price and charge U.S. consumers less
than they ultimately did.403
Extending the reach of the FTAIA to foreign conduct with an im-
pact on U.S. commerce makes economic sense.404  Judge Higginbot-
ham’s dissent in Den Norske was correct: Emphasizing the role of
deterrence protects market efficiency.405  He argued that a broad in-
terpretation of the FTAIA would aid the DOJ’s efforts in curtailing
international cartels.406  A cartel’s overall profitability is favorably im-
pacted by anticompetitive conduct, and this may lead cartel members
to either further restrict the output or increase the price of the prod-
uct.407  A decrease in competition could potentially move market
395. Id. at 1.
396. Id.





402. Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816, 819 (7th Cir. 2015).
403. Id.
404. See O’Connell, supra note 212, at 5. R
405. Riazi, supra note 2, at 1317 (citing Den Norske Stats Oljeseelskap As v. HeereMac Vof, R
241 F.3d 420, 431 (5th Cir. 2001) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting)).
406. Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 434.
407. Id.; Cartels, ECON. ONLINE, supra note 40. R
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-1\DPL107.txt unknown Seq: 41 18-APR-17 9:35
2016] U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS 215
share away from these efficient producers.408  Thus, a consistent appli-
cation of the Ninth Circuit ruling across all U.S. jurisdictions will limit
both this unacceptable behavior and the foreign companies’ incentive
to form cartels.  Foreign companies will be deterred from price-fixing
knowing that they could be liable for anticompetitive conspiracies,
even for transactions that occurred outside of the United States.409
Studies have already shown that antitrust enforcement increases pro-
ductivity growth.410  In fact, a study has concluded that the price of
products tends to drop approximately twenty to forty percent after
cartels are broken up.411  The price-fixing issue is not only prevalent in
the manufacturing industry, but also in the industries at issue in Hui
Hsiung and Motorola.412  Studies show that increased competition also
benefits the agricultural, telecommunications, transport, and profes-
sional services industries.413  Moreover, even though competition usu-
ally starts at a domestic level, a ruling against cartel formation will
positively affect the competitiveness of the domestic products as they
compete in the international community.414  Companies typically ac-
quire their production inputs from local markets and industries.415  If
these industries lack competition, product prices in these markets may
not be priced competitively, which affects the finished products’ com-
petitiveness with foreign rivals.416
A U.S. Supreme Court ruling in favor of the Seventh Circuit will
also prevent companies from potentially leaving the United States to
avoid compliance with antitrust laws.417  Domestic companies with
foreign subsidiaries that seek to increase their market share by collud-
ing to fix the prices of products will be deterred from engaging in ille-
gal conduct, but they will also be incentivized to keep their businesses
in the country.418  Mere knowledge that companies can be liable in the
United States for engaging in illegal, extraterritorial conduct that indi-
rectly affects U.S. consumers could in itself discourage the companies
from pursuing such conduct.419  Likewise, without the benefit of being
408. Id.
409. Haas, supra note 233, at 119. R
410. Kitzmuller & Licetti, supra note 392, at 1–5. R
411. See id. at 2.
412. United States v. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 2015); Motorola Mobility LLC v.
AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816, 817 (7th Cir. 2015).
413. Kitzmuller & Licetti, supra note 392, at 2–4. R
414. Id. at 1–2.
415. Id. at 3.
416. Id. at 1–2.
417. Brief of Amicus Curiae Economists and Professors, supra note 291, at 25. R
418. Id.
419. Id. at 4–5.
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exculpated from any extraterritorial conduct, companies will rather
stay in the United States than incur expensive costs of moving over-
seas.  This is a win-win situation; prices of products remain controlled
by the natural forces of supply and demand, and small and local com-
panies are able to compete with the bigger and international compa-
nies.  On the contrary, a ruling that limits the extraterritorial reach of
the FTAIA to non-import commerce, similar to what the Seventh Cir-
cuit held, will encourage companies to move their operations overseas
and strategically only deal with the United States in instances they are
certain will not subject them to either the Sherman Act or FTAIA.420
Arguably, ruling in favor of the Ninth Circuit could hurt companies
that trade with the United States indirectly.  These companies have
legitimate reasons for incorporating as “foreign subsidiaries,” and sub-
jecting them to U.S. jurisdiction would in effect deplete some of these
purposes.421  Although domestic legal remedies are available in some
foreign countries, as mentioned above, they are unlikely to deter
price-fixing by international cartels.422
Moreover, having a more consistent approach in cases like this will
strengthen and harmonize the partnership across nations.  Needless to
say, the cooperation between these countries can play a significant
role in attaining this objective.  Bilateral agreements between the
countries have proven that, though challenging, implementing this
stricter rule is not impossible.423  International trade rules, such as the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO), Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD), and agreements between countries, imply the
general acceptance of this proposal.424  The rapid growth in globaliza-
tion has forced governments to institute and enforce policies that both
protect domestic products from multinational firms and encourage the
domestic firms to compete internationally, in furtherance of interna-
tional trade.425
420. Id. at 12.
421. Foreign subsidiaries are usually created to take advantage of tax reductions and more
cost-effective means of production and manufacturing, limit a parent company’s potential losses
of the subsidiaries, diversify a parent company’s product line, maintain the identity of the parent
company distinct as those of the subsidiaries, acquire easier access to local knowledge and more
advanced skills in the country of the subsidiaries. The Pros and Cons of Setting Up a Foreign
Subsidiary, SHIELD GEO GLOB. EMP’T SOLS., http://shieldgeo.com/the-pros-and-cons-of-setting-
up-a-foreign-subsidiary-2/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2016); see also Subsidiary, BUS. LAW. (Mar. 31,
2012), http://www.businesslawyers-online.com/blog/subsidiary.
422. See supra notes 328–33 and accompanying text.
423. See Haas, supra note 233, at 120. R
424. Id. at 120–22.
425. Id. at 121.
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One of the partnerships the European Union (EU) and the U.S.
governments are currently working on is called the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP).426  Its aim is to further de-
velop the strong relationship nations have and leverage that relation-
ship to boost economic growth and international competitiveness.427
The agreement purports to provide greater transparency around trade
and investment regulation while ensuring the quality of the prod-
ucts.428  As part of the agreement, the governments seek to eliminate
all tariffs, other duties, and charges on trade in various products be-
tween the United States and the European Union.429
The proponents of T-TIP point out that the elimination of tariffs
and quotas will, among other things, entail lower costs of import to
each of the regions, put products from one area “on equal footing”
with the products from another, create more jobs, lower the unem-
ployment rate, increase competitiveness, and improve the overall
growth of members of the agreement.430  Although the agreement
seems ambitious at this time, it intends to link two of the world’s larg-
426. Leala Padmanabhan, TTIP: The EU-US Trade Deal Explained, BBC NEWS (Dec. 18,
2004), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-30493297.  With President Trump’s withdrawal from
the controversial Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) days after his inauguration and his protection-
ist policies, the T-TIP is likely to be “in the freezer at least for a while.”  Donna Rachel Ed-




428. Andrew Walker, TTIP: Why the EU-US Trade Deal Matters, BBC NEWS (May 13, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-30493297.
429. Id.  The United States’ reciprocal access to the EU market will allow for the integration
of high quality “made-in-USA” products into the EU supply chains and, eventually, to European
customers. See Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP), U.S. TRADE REP.,
https://ustr.gov/ttip (last visited Aug. 29, 2016).  Moreover, non-tariff barriers and regulatory is-
sues that reduce opportunities to compete against domestic products will be eliminated. See
Walker, supra note 428.  For example, when importing products, firms no longer have to go R
through expensive and repetitive tests to satisfy differing requirements of the United States and
EU. Id.  The T-TIP aims to come up with “common standards” to reduce the costs of these
redundant tests. Id.
430. Id.; see What Is TTIP?, WAR ON WANT, http://waronwant.org/what-ttip (last visited Aug.
13, 2016); What You Need to Know About TTIP, EURO. AM. CHAM. OF COMM., http://www
.eaccny.com/international-business-resources/what-you-need-to-know-about-ttip/.  For example,
U.S. farmers will no longer have to pay over seven percent in duties when shipping to Europe,
compared to EU competitors that pay no duties on their shipments.  Sean Ellis, U.S.-EU Trade
Agreement Could Benefit Agriculture, CAPITAL PRESS (Oct. 29, 2014, 10:12 AM), http://www
.capitalpress.com/Nation_World/Nation/20141029/us-eu-trade-agreement-could-benefit-.  As a
result, prices of products will decrease; customers get incentives to purchase more; businesses
will have to create more jobs to keep up with the demand; and more companies will export to
the EU, possibly impacting the country’s trade balance. See What You Need To Know About
TTIP, supra.
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est economies to generate a third of the world’s GDP.431  Critics ar-
gue, however, that the deregulation of several national laws—possibly
resulting in lower consumer standards, as well as compromised laws
covering intellectual property, food safety, privacy and data collection,
and democratic legitimacy—are all steps in the wrong direction.432
Having an established rule that foreign companies’ non-import
trade conduct can be subjected to U.S. antitrust laws, as long as the
conduct had an “immediate consequence” on U.S. commerce, could
mitigate the risks associated with the opening of U.S. and EU mar-
kets.  Foreign companies that will be encouraged to invest in the
United States as a result of T-TIP will have an understanding of the
laws and the possible repercussions of any business transaction in
which they take part.  These companies do not need to determine if
and how any of their strategic decisions can be subjected to either the
Seventh or Ninth Circuit rulings before securing deals or signing
agreements.  The certainty will provide companies with notice and un-
derstanding of how the law affects their decisions, thereby making
their investments less risky.  In return, investments could become
safer, eventually having a favorable impact on the continued develop-
ment of the world economy.
V. CONCLUSION
International commerce has expanded over time.  Accordingly, the
U.S. courts’ interpretation of antitrust laws must keep up with this
rapid growth.  It is time to apply a consistent rule that will solve the
convoluted body of law and conflicting application of that body of law
by the courts.  U.S. courts must be able to reach foreign companies’
extraterritorial conduct that have wrongfully affected the U.S. econ-
omy.  Though international comity may have been a concern in years
past, deterrence should bear a greater weight in determining whether
a foreign company is subject to the United States’ jurisdiction.  After
all, antitrust laws are geared towards protecting consumers.  Ex-
431. What You Need To Know About TTIP, supra note 430. R
432. Padmanabhan, supra note 426.  For example, the EU has stricter food regulations com- R
pared to the US. Opening the market to cheaper products from the United States might sacrifice
those high standards. Id.  The need for integration, harmonization, and mutual recognition of
laws will force the nations to give up part of the democracy it was used to when both were
independently legislating and executing own laws. See id.  It is also feared that the Agreement
could bring back the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement—an agreement that was largely crit-
icized by the EU. Id.  Jobs—though the other party believes will be created—could actually lead
to unemployment as jobs switch to the US where labor standards and trade union rights are
lower. Id.  The idea of Investor-State Dispute Settlements is what scares the critics most. Id.  In
effect, this could mean that corporations can dictate policies that would benefit them, but ad-
versely impact the consumers. Id.
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panding the reach of the FTAIA to include transactions that occurred
outside of the United States, but still have direct and significant ef-
fects in the United States, will allow for a more rigid yet necessary
rule in the age of increasing international commerce.  Consistency
across all federal courts will provide foreign companies greater trans-
parency with regard to the laws that govern both their import and
non-import trade transactions; formation of cartels will be minimized;
price-fixing of products will be easily detected and stopped; innova-
tion and creativity will be encouraged; competition will increase; and
prices of goods will likely decrease.  Consequently, the United States
and the global economy will be favorably impacted.
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